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This paper analyzes the role of ethnic communities in shaping the recent immigration boom to Spain. We
find that ethnic communities exerted a strong positive effect on the scale and a strong negative effect on the
skill structure of this immigration. Unlike previous studies, we explicitly acknowledge similarities among
final migration destinations and thus partly relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. We
strengthen our causal interpretation by controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in bilateral mi-
gration costs, and by adopting an instrumental variables approach. Our results suggest that previous estimates
of the scale effect are upward-biased by approximately 50%.
Keywords: international migration, ethnic networks, family and friends effect, skill structure of migration, Spain.
JEL classification: F22
∗This paper has benefitted from valuable suggestions by Wilhelm Kohler and Udo Kreickemeier. We thank seminar participants at
the 14th Göttinger Workshop “Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen” (University of Göttingen) for their comments. Our research
assistants at the Chairs of International Economics at the University of Tübingen have provided excellent support. Marcel Smolka
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1 Introduction
Aggregate cross-border migration evolves gradually over time. This phenomenon has been partly attributed to
the fact that settled migrants assist would-be migrants from the same country in, inter alia, their search for jobs
and housing (Munshi, 2003). The on-site help provided by the co-ethnic peers has the potential to reduce the
barriers to migration for prospective newcomers. This so-called family and friends (or network) effect entails
that at the aggregate level migration begets further migration.1 Although the relevance of this effect is widely
acknowledged in the literature (Hatton, 1995; Clark et al., 2007), its exact empirical identification remains a
challenging task.
Current discussions on immigration often center around the skills of new immigrants required to foster
economic growth in the receiving economy, in addition to the optimal scale of immigration. Many OECD
countries are primarily interested in high-skilled immigrants who are trained in specific fields, such as engi-
neering or medical sciences. Chiswick (1999) argues that high-skilled individuals have lower effective costs
of migration than low-skilled individuals, which opens up the possibility for migrants to be positively selected
in terms of their skills.2 At the same time, through its impact on migration costs, the family and friends effect
could bias the skill structure of immigration towards the low-skilled individuals.
This paper provides new evidence on the importance of ethnic migrant communities in shaping the total
size (scale) and skill structure of immigration, drawing on rich migration data from the recent immigration
boom to Spain.3 In addition to the fact that high quality data on aggregate migration are scarce, estimated
migration functions often lack an explicit micro-foundation (Clark et al., 2007; Lewer & Van den Berg, 2008;
Pedersen et al., 2008; Mayda, 2010).4 To the extent that they do have a micro-foundation (Beine et al.,
2011,2012; Beine & Salomone, forthcoming), they hinge on two strong assumptions. The first is the so-called
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.5 It implies that the odds ratio between any two alter-
native migration destinations is independent of the number and characteristics of other migration destinations
(Bertoli & Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2011). The second assumption is that the unobserved heterogeneity
1The network externality generates a welfare loss in the laissez-faire transition path equilibrium (Carrington et al., 1996; Chau,
1997). This calls for policy intervention in the form of migration subsidies that accelerate the speed of migration.
2There is evidence that migrants are, in general, positively selected due to skill-dependent absolute income differences across
countries (Grogger & Hanson, 2011). This casts doubt on the validity of the Roy model (Borjas, 1987), which highlights the importance
of relative returns to skill; see also Belot & Hatton (forthcoming). The evidence on selection in the Mexican-U.S. migration corridor
is mixed (Chiquiar & Hanson, 2005; Orrenius & Zavodny, 2005; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2011).
3The recent immigration experience in Spain has garnered a lot of attention among policymakers, business managers, and jour-
nalists. From 1997 to 2009, Spanish municipalities registered roughly six million new immigrants, of which Romanians account
for 13.6%, followed by Moroccans (11.1%), Ecuadorians (8.2%), Colombians (6.1%), Britons (5.3%), and Bolivians (4.7%). These
numbers are own calculations based on data from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica (INE).
4For the location choice of migrants within borders, see Zavodny (1997,1999), Chiswick & Miller (2004), Card & Lewis (2007),
and Jayet et al. (2010), in addition to the pioneering work by Bartel (1989). Survey-based studies on migration decisions at the
micro-level include Baghdadi (2005), Bauer et al. (2005,2009), and Dolfin & Genicot (2010).
5As an exception, the paper by Ortega & Peri (2009) does partly relax the IIA assumption. However, it does neither identify the
family and friends effect nor does it address selection on skills.
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in bilateral migration costs is uncorrelated with the size of the ethnic community abroad. Violations of either
assumption can lead to a misspecified migration function and biased estimates.
We propose a novel identification strategy that is consistent with utility-maximizing behavior of individ-
uals, and that relaxes both assumptions mentioned above. In the spirit of McFadden (1984, 1422-1428), we
set up a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) migration model in which final migration destinations within the
same country or region are considered to be similar in the sense that they share a common political, economic,
and cultural background. It will be shown that acknowledging such similarities is incompatible with the IIA
property. We estimate an aggregate migration function derived from the NMNL model in an extended fixed
effects framework, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in bilateral migration costs.6 In addition to re-
laxing IIA, this approach goes a long way towards purging the estimates from endogeneity bias, relative to
existing literature. Endogeneity has its roots in the two-way relationship between ethnic migrant communities
and bilateral migration costs. On the one hand, through the family and friends effect, the size of ethnic migrant
communities appears as an argument in the migration cost function determining future migration. On the other
hand, the ethnic migrant community is the result of past immigration and thus itself influenced by bilateral
migration costs. We furthermore control for bilateral trading and investment relationships and test for their
potential to facilitate bilateral migration. The effects of ethnic communities on trade (Gould, 1994; Rauch &
Trindade, 2002; Peri & Requena-Silvente, 2010) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Javorcik et al., 2011)
are relatively well understood, but the literature on the causal effects of trade and FDI on migration is scarce.
We summarize our findings as follows. First, ethnic networks exert a strong positive effect on the scale
and a strong negative effect on the skill structure of immigration. We estimate that a doubling of the size of
the ethnic migrant community leads to a rise in future immigration from the same origin by almost 50%, and
to a decline in the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled individuals in this immigration by approximately 30%.7
Second, unobserved heterogeneity in bilateral migration costs is indeed correlated with the size of the ethnic
community abroad. Failing to account for this heterogeneity leads to an upward bias of about 50% in the
estimation of the scale effect. Third, violations of the IIA property are pervasive in our data. These violations
translate into cross-regional differences in estimated network elasticities which have gone unnoticed in the
existing literature. Finally, bilateral trading and investment relations do not seem to have a relevant impact on
the scale and skill structure of migration.
In terms of focus and econometric approach, our paper is most closely related to the two above-mentioned
studies by Beine et al. (2011,2012), in spite of our novel identification strategy. Beine et al. (2011) investigate
6One might be tempted to advocate the use of panel methods in order to control for the time-invariant component of bilateral
migration costs. Our approach is different, however, since a consistent framework for estimating a migration model with panel data is
not yet available.
7We strengthen our causal interpretation by adopting an instrumental variables approach. Historical bilateral migration flows are
shown to have significant explanatory power for the size of bilateral ethnic communities even after a relatively long period of time. The
instrumental variables estimator is asymptotically consistent under the assumption that the historical migration flows are uncorrelated
with the unobserved determinants of the scale and skill structure of the recent immigration boom.
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the determinants of the size and skill content of migration flows between the years 1990 and 2000 into 30
OECD countries. The authors’ estimates suggest an average elasticity of bilateral migration flows with respect
to ethnic communities in the destination country of around 0.7. Furthermore, economies hosting large ethnic
migrant communities from a given country can expect to receive a larger proportion of low-skilled migrants
from that country.8 The follow-up paper by Beine et al. (2012) employs a data structure similar to ours, focus-
ing on U.S. immigration. It separately identifies what the authors call local and national network externalities,
saying that local ethnic communities facilitate assimilation, while nation-wide ethnic communities reduce visa
costs. Our definition of the family and friends effect corresponds to their local assimilation effect, while we
treat the national network externality as a fixed effect in our estimation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes individual decision making
in a random utility framework which partly relaxes the IIA assumption. We derive estimable equations from
this model for the scale and skill structure of immigration. In section 3 we present our estimation strategy to
deal with endogeneity issues and introduce in detail the data we employ in our econometric analysis. Section
4 presents our estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Our main goal in this paper is to estimate the impact of migrant networks on the scale and skill structure of
immigration flows to Spain. For this purpose, we set up a multi-country random utility framework with many
origin and destination countries. Our framework takes the form of a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model
along the lines of McFadden (1984, 1422-1428).
2.1 Hierarchical Decision Making in Migration
We assume that the decision making process leading to migration follows a hierarchical structure in which
similar alternative migration destinations are grouped into clusters. Individuals eliminate clusters until a sin-
gle alternative migration destination remains. Decision making can be described in a hierarchical manner:
first to which country to migrate (including the home country), second which region to move to within the
chosen country, and third which destination to pick within the preferred region.9 Let i = {1, . . . , I} index ori-
gins, j = {1, . . . , J(i)} index the final migration destinations, z = {1, . . . , Z(i)} index the primary clusters
(countries), and r = {1, . . . , R(i)} index the secondary clusters (regions within countries), as perceived by
8McKenzie & Rapoport (2010) find that the probability of positive self-selection on education from Mexican migrants to the U.S.
is the larger, the smaller the migrant network in the origin community. Bertoli (2010) uses rich individual-level data on Ecuadorian
emigrants, confirming a positive interaction between the size of the ethnic community abroad and the extent of negative self-selection.
Grogger & Hanson (2011) touch upon this interaction as well; see their robustness checks in table 7 on page 53.
9In Ortega & Peri (2009), the first decision of individuals is between going abroad and staying at home. Our model can incorporate
this additional structure without affecting our econometric implementation.
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individuals living in country i. Let country i be one element in each of the sets {1, . . . , Z(i)}, {1, . . . , R(i)},
and {1, . . . , J(i)}, such that staying in the home country is always an option.10 Define Aizr to be the set of
final migration destinations belonging to region r in country z, and Aiz to be the set of regions belonging to
country z, again from the viewpoint of individuals living in country i.
We write the utility of individual o who migrates from country i to destination j and lives in destination j
as:
Uoij = ξij + πiz + e
o
ij , (1)
where o = {1, . . . , O(i)} identifies individuals originating from country i, and ξij and πiz are sub-utility
functions relevant for moving from country i to destination j and living in destination j, with j ∈ Aizr and
r ∈ Aiz . The value of the function ξij varies across combinations of origin countries and final migration
destinations. Among other things, it includes destination-specific economic conditions and bilateral migration
costs. The value of the function πiz varies across combinations of origin and destination countries, but not
across migration destinations in a given country. It reflects the impact of country-specific immigration policies.
Finally, eoij is a stochastic (random) utility component, whose individual-specific realizations vary across final
migration destinations.
For the time being, let all individuals be of a single skill type. We then write:
ξij = αWj +Xj − γCij , α, γ > 0, (2)
where Wj is the destination-specific wage per unit of human capital, Xj refers to other utility-relevant charac-
teristics of destination j (for example the state of the housing market or the climate), and Cij captures bilateral
costs of moving and assimilation. The parameter α gives the units of human capital per individual such that all
workers in j earn the same wage, αWj . Similarly, the parameter γ represents the ease with which individuals
are able to cope with migration costs, and γCij are effective costs of migration. The bilateral costs of mov-
ing and assimilation, Cij , will be specified and discussed in more detail below. Suffice it to say here that we
decompose them into three elements:
Cij = ψir + ϑwj + cij , (3)
where ψir varies across combinations of origin countries and destination regions within countries, ϑwj varies
across combinations of world regions and final migration destinations, and cij varies across combinations of
origin countries and final migration destinations. For expositional convenience, we define ξ̃ij ≡ ξij + γψir.
Each individual is assumed to choose from the set of final migration destinations (including the home
country) the alternative from which she derives the highest utility:
jo = argmax(Uoi1, . . . , U
o
iJ(i)), j
o ∈ {1, . . . , J(i)}. (4)
10The home country i is always a degenerate nest in the sense that it represents a single final migration destination.
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The probability that individual o from country i migrates to destination j is equal to the probability that this
individual associates the largest utility with moving to destination j:
P oi (j
o = j) = Pr(Uoij > U
o
ik ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , J(i)} : k 6= j)
= Pr(eoik − e
o
ij ≤ ξij − ξik + πiz − πiz′ ;
∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , J(i)} : k 6= j), (5)
where j ∈ Aizr, r ∈ Aiz , k ∈ Aiz′ℓ, and ℓ ∈ Aiz′ .
By the laws of conditional probability, we can express this probability as a product of transition probabili-
ties. For j ∈ Aizr, r ∈ Aiz , we have:
P oi (j
o = j) = P oi (j







o ∈ Aiz). (6)
These probabilities depend on the distribution assumed for the random utility parameters, eoi1, . . . , e
o
iJ(i). The
existing literature on network effects in migration assumes these parameters to be drawn independently from
the same Extreme Value Type I distribution. This assumption implies the IIA property, according to which
the ratio of two choice probabilities, P oi (j
o = j)/P oi (j
o = k), is independent of the non-random utility
components of migration destinations other than j and k.
We relax this assumption and assume a Generalized Extreme Value distribution (GEV) for the random
utility parameters; see McFadden (1984, 1422-1428) for technical details. This generalization allows for the
random utility parameters of final migrations destinations within the same country or region to be mutually
correlated, whereas the parameters of destinations in different countries are independent. Define on the unit
interval two functions, φz ≡ φ(xz) and ϕr ≡ ϕ(yr), measuring the similarity of final migration destinations in
country z and region r, respectively. The vector xz collects all attributes common to locations in z, and accord-
ingly for the vector yr. Important elements of the vector xz are the migration policy and the political system,
while the vector yr includes, among other things, the level of economic development and the cultural back-
ground. It will become evident below that this generalization has important implications for the specification
of the migration function.
As shown by McFadden (1984, 1422-1428), each transition probability has a closed-form analytical solu-
tion:
P oi (j




















where λz = 1 − φz and κr = 1 − ϕr measure the dissimilarity (increasing with higher values) of migration
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exp[Φiℓκℓ − γψiℓ/λz]. (11)
The inclusive values Φir and Ωiz summarize the characteristics of all migration destinations within region
r and within country z, respectively. Using equations (6) to (11) and aggregating over all individuals from




exp[ξ̃ij/(λzκr)− γψir/λz + πiz]
∑Z(i)
a=1 exp[πia +Ωiaλa] exp[(1− κr)Φir + (1− λz)Ωiz]
, (12)
where mij is the number of individuals migrating from i to j, and mi is the initial population size of country
i. This ij-specific bilateral migration rate will serve as the basis for our econometric implementation. It is
not independent of the attractiveness of other migration destinations k 6= j, whether in the same region r (or
country z) or not. For example, an increase in the wage rate of any destination k, dWk > 0, re-directs migration
flows from all other destinations to destination k, ∂(mij/mi)/∂Wk < 0 and ∂(mik/mi)/∂Wk > 0. It is in
this sense that we refer to the product below the fraction line in equation (12) as a “multilateral resistance”
term.11
As opposed to the standard MNL model used by Beine et al. (2011,2012), our NMNL modelling frame-
work allows for changes in economic conditions in migration destinations other than j to induce non-uniform
effects on the ij-specific bilateral migration rate (12), depending on whether these destinations belong to the
same country or region as j. In particular, as shown by McFadden (1984, 1422-1428), the migration rate,
mij/mi, is most sensitive to changes in other destinations in the same region. The phenomenon that such
substitution effects are stronger within than across regions (and stronger within than across countries) is due
to the similarity of migration destinations within the same region (and within the same country).
We now turn to a more precise definition of bilateral migration costs, Cij . Following Beine et al. (2011),
we assume that these costs are a decreasing and globally convex function of the size of the ethnic community
in destination j,Mij , such that ∂Cij/∂Mij < 0 and ∂
2Cij/∂M
2
ij > 0. This assumption reflects the family and
friends effect. Furthermore, we hypothesize that trading and investment relations, represented by tij and Fij ,
respectively, exert a similar effect on migration costs, ∂Cij/∂δij < 0 and ∂
2Cij/∂δ
2
ij > 0, δ ∈ {t, F}. We
may think of three reasons for a positive causal effect of trade on migration. First, intermediate input importers
11Mayda (2010) speaks of “multilateral pull” effects. The idea of “multilateral resistance” here is similar to that in the gravity
equation for international trade flows; see Anderson & van Wincoop (2003). Anderson (2011) sketches a general equilibrium migration
model with multilateral resistance.
6
and exporters alike host jobs which may be attractive for the trading partner’s workers due to relationship-
specific knowledge. Second, tight business links, reflected by high trade volumes, are often accompanied by
a well-developed traveling and transportation infrastructure. This infrastructure can facilitate bilateral migra-
tion. Third, in case of relevant export volumes from country i to destination j, individuals from country i
with home-biased preferences have lower barriers to migrate to destination j. Related arguments apply to the
effects of bilateral capital flows to final migration destinations.12 For example, corporate employees of foreign
multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing in destination j may expect to find attractive employment oppor-
tunities in affiliated firms in destination j. Or, more generally speaking, it seems plausible to expect MNEs to
exhibit a cultural bias when it comes to filling vacancies in their affiliates abroad. This bias may take the form
of preferential treatments of job applicants from the country in which the MNEs’ headquarters are located.
The variable tij is the sum of bilateral imports and exports in the period before migration takes place, and
Fij is the stock of bilateral investment in some final migration destination j, prior to migration. A conve-
nient specification of migration costs that readily incorporates the idea of positive but diminishing returns to
networks, trade, and FDI uses the logs of M , t, and F :
Cij = ψir + ϑwj − θ ln(1 +Mij)− ρ ln(1 + tij)− σ ln(1 + Fij). (13)
We add one to the variables M , t, and F before taking logs in order to abstract from infinitely large migration
costs. The parameter θ > 0 is a measure for the strength of the family and friends effect, and similarly for
ρ > 0 and σ > 0 with respect to the trade and FDI effect, respectively.
An important determinant of the bilateral migration costs, Cij , is the geographical and cultural distance
between source and destination. We argue that all elements of this distance originate at the level of regions
rather than provinces. In Spain, for example, this argument applies to linguistic differences across regions, as
well as to other forces deriving from a political and historical context: The Basque Autonomous Community
and Navarre both have strong cultural ties with the Northern Basque Country which is part of French national
territory.13 A similar argument applies to Catalonia as well. The region Galicia, in turn, has long been suffering
from a chronic growth weakness, which has led to mass emigration in the 19th and 20th century, in particular to
Latin American countries. In our specification of bilateral migration costs, we thus assume that the ir-specific
term ψir represents the full geographical and cultural distance between origin country i and all final migration
destinations j ∈ Aizr, r ∈ Aiz .
Notice that we have so far defined ethnic communities in terms of origin countries. Our model could thus
be prone to ignoring all potential network externalities that materialize at geographical, political, or cultural
levels which go beyond this simple country-based definition. This issue seems to be an important shortcoming
12We only look at the effects of inward investments on inward migration; see Buch et al. (2006) for a study on the multi-faceted
links between migration (inward and outward) and investment (inward and outward).
13The Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre form the Spanish part of the Basque Country (Paı́s Vasco in Spanish; Euskal
Herria in Basque language).
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in light of the cultural proximity among, for example, Latin American countries. It applies however to all
existing studies we are aware of and may lead to biased estimates due to omitted variables. We therefore allow
for network effects to occur at the bilateral level of world regions and final migration destinations, captured by
thewj-specific term ϑwj . Our definition of world regions mostly follows that of the World Bank, distinguishing
among Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, East Asia & Pacific, South Asia, Latin America &
Caribbean, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Western Europe, and North America & Australia.
2.2 Scale of Immigration Flows
Substituting ξ̃ij in equation (12) and using equation (13), taking logs, and rearranging terms yields the follow-











+µi + µiz + µj + µwj + µir, (14)
where





µiz ≡ (λz − 1)Ωiz + πiz,
µj ≡ (αWj +Xj)/(λzκr),
µwj ≡ −γϑwj/(λzκr),
µir ≡ (κr − 1)Φir − γψir/λz.
We summarize three characteristics of this migration function. First, even if we abstract from the effects
operating through the multilateral resistance term, the elasticity of the migration inflow, mij , with respect
to the size of the ethnic community, Mij , is a function of the dissimilarities of final migration destinations
in country z and region r, λz and κr. The same holds true for the elasticities of migration with respect to
trade and FDI. Second, the multilateral resistance effects are jointly captured by the terms µi, µiz , and µir.
In the standard multinomial logit migration model (λz = κr = 1 ∀z, r), the multilateral resistance effects
with dimension iz and ir, nested in µiz and µir, collapse to zero. Third, bilateral migration costs impact on
bilateral migration through the terms γϑwj/(λzκr) (nested in µwj) and γψir/λz (nested in µir), in addition to
the ij-specific effects of ethnic migrant communities, trade, and FDI.
Proposition 1. Assume the effects operating through the multilateral resistance term remain constant.
a) The number of new migrants arriving within a given period of time from some country i in some final
migration destination j ∈ Aizr, r ∈ Aiz , is the larger, the larger the bilateral migrant community at the
beginning of this period:
∂ ln(mij)
∂ ln(1+Mij)
= θγλzκr > 0.
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b) This effect is the smaller, the larger the dissimilarity among final migration destinations in the same











Equivalent statements apply to the effects of bilateral trade and FDI on bilateral migration.
The intuition for the second part of proposition 1 is the following. If final migration destinations in the
same country or region are very similar, it is relatively easy to substitute one destination j ∈ Aizr by another
destination k ∈ Aizr, r ∈ Aiz . Hence, small changes in the attractiveness of destination j will induce relatively
large substitution effects among all final migration destinations in region r. The opposite holds true for final
migration destination which are very dissimilar.
2.3 Skill Structure of Immigration Flows
We now relax the assumption of homogeneous skills across individuals. In particular, we distinguish between
high-skilled and low-skilled individuals, denoted by h and l, respectively. Recall that in equation (2), the
parameter α gives the units of human capital per individual and γ represents the ease with which individuals
are able to cope with migration costs (decreasing with higher values). We assume that the parameters α and
γ are skill-specific, and, more precisely, that α (γ) is larger (smaller) for high-skilled individuals than for
low-skilled individuals, αh > αl and γh < γl. This setup introduces two deterministic sources of utility
differences across individuals, both of which originate in an individual’s skill level: Individuals with higher
skills (more human capital) earn higher wages and have lower effective costs of moving and assimilation. The
latter assumption is in line with Chiswick (1999), who argues that the high-skilled can handle their migration
process more efficiently than the low-skilled. We can thus formulate one migration function for each skill group
by complete analogy to equation (14). Subtracting the equation for low-skilled immigrants from country i in

























where the variables with an asterisk (∗) are differences between the corresponding parameters for high-skilled
and low-skilled individuals, i.e., γ∗ ≡ γh − γl, for instance. Given that γl > γh, we can state the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume the effects operating through the multilateral resistance term remain constant.
a) The ratio of new high-skilled to new low-skilled migrants arriving within a given period of time from
some country i in some final migration destination j ∈ Aizr, r ∈ Aiz , is the smaller, the larger the
9









b) This effect is the smaller, the larger the dissimilarity among final migration destinations in the same

















Equivalent statements apply to the effects of bilateral trade and FDI on bilateral migration.
The specification of migration costs in equation (13) is independent of an individual’s skill level, which means
that the cost-reducing effect of the ethnic community abroad is equally strong for high-skilled and low-skilled
individuals. The same holds true for the effects of bilateral trade and investment relations. However, individuals
differ in their abilities to cope with the costs of moving and assimilation, and therefore in their effective costs
of migration. Intuitively, the first part of proposition 2 tells us that this difference is less important for low
levels of migration costs. Hence, it is the low-skilled individuals who benefit the most from a reduction in
migration costs. This result can also be seen against the backdrop of recent work by Mrázowá & Neary (2011)
on selection effects with heterogeneous firms. The authors show that more efficient firms will select into the
activity with lower market-access costs if and only if firms’ maximum profits are supermodular in production
and market-access costs.14
To show the similarity to our setup of selection into migration, we define the migration gain as the differ-
ence in utility from migrating from country i to destination j and staying in country i:
U ij(W,C, π, α, γ, ·) := Uij − Uii = αW ij +Xij − γCij + πiz + eij − eii, (16)
where a variable with a bar represents the difference in that variable for individuals from country iwho migrate
to destination j and individuals from country i who stay in their home country. Let ∆s be the finite difference
between the values of a function evaluated at parameter values for high-skilled individuals and those for low-
skilled individuals. We then have:
∆sU ij(W,C, π, α, γ, ·) = ∆sUij −∆sUii












which is the difference in migration gains across skill types. The first term on the right-hand side of equation
(17) is positive, provided the wage rate is larger abroad than at home. The incentive to migrate for any positive
wage differential becomes magnified through the individual amount of human capital. Accordingly, the migra-
tion gain from international wage differences is larger for high-skilled than for low-skilled individuals (wage
14In the context of Mrázowá & Neary (2011), supermodularity means that higher variable trade costs reduce the absolute cost
disadvantage of low-productivity firms relative to high-productivity firms.
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effect). The second term is also positive, given that migration entails some costs of moving and assimilation.
The effective costs are lower for high-skilled than for low-skilled individuals, so that there is also a cost effect
on selection. It is precisely this cost channel through which the family and friends effect impacts on the extent
of positive selection in migration. The last two terms together (policy effect) are positive if policies facilitating
high-skilled immigration apply, and zero if immigration policies are skill-neutral.
























(b) Large Ethnic Community Abroad
† The figure shows the differential migration gain for high-skilled individuals over low-skilled individuals, (a) for a zero ethnic com-
munity abroad, and (b) for a large ethnic community abroad. For the sake of exposition, both subfigures assume πiz = πii, Xj = Xi,
eij = eii, and α
s = 1 − γs, s ∈ {h, l}. The migration gain U ij is a function of α and γ, and given by the upward sloping solid
black line. It is the difference between the individual wage gain from migration, αsW ij , and the effective costs of migration, γ
sCij ,
s ∈ {h, l}. In panel (a), low-skilled individuals exhibit a negative migration gain and high-skilled individuals a positive migration
gain. The difference between the two is the differential migration gain ∆sU ij . In panel (b), the low level of migration costs, given by
C
′
ij , renders the migration gain positive for both types of skill. Importantly, the differential migration gain is strictly smaller in panel
(b) than in panel (a) because low-skilled individuals benefit more from the cost reduction than high-skilled individuals.
In sum, there is a differential migration gain for high-skilled individuals over low-skilled individuals; see
figure 1 for a graphical exposition. Leaving the policy effect aside, we see that high-skilled individuals are
more likely to self-select into migration out of both wage and cost considerations.15 Importantly, however, the
bilateral moving costs are reduced through the family and friends effect, which brings down the differential
migration gain and thus attracts a larger proportion of low-skilled individuals; see figure 1(b).16 The marginal
15In the terminology of Mrázowá & Neary (2011), our utility function is supermodular in (i) wages and individual skills and (ii)
migration costs and individual skills.
16There is a second obvious reason why the differential migration gain could be endogenous to the level of migration. If equilibrium
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reduction of the differential migration gain is the larger, the larger the difference between γl and γh.
3 Estimation Strategy and Data
This section describes our estimation strategy and presents the different variables we employ in our economet-
ric analysis. We use Spanish data to estimate different variants of the models given by equations (14) and (15),
each coupled with a stochastic error term. All migration data come from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de
Estadı́stica (INE).17 A major advantage of these data is that they include both documented and undocumented
immigrants. This holds true for data on both the scale and the skill structure of immigration flows, although
the variables are derived from two different data sources provided by INE. The full internet sources of our data
are listed in table A.1 in the appendix.
We consider two different aggregation levels for final migration destinations in Spain. The first model
for the scale of immigration flows, given by equation (14), is estimated at the level of Spanish provinces
(provincias). Due to reasons of data availability, the second model for the skill structure of immigration flows,
given by equation (15), is estimated at the level of Spanish regions (comunidades autónomas).18 For both
models, our sample comprises the 55 most important migrant-sending countries, which are listed in table A.2
in the appendix.19
3.1 Scale of Immigration Flows
A simple fixed effects specification computes all variables of equation (14) as deviations from their country
means (within-transformation), which wipes out all country-specific fixed effects.20 These are all effects nested
wages are a function of a country’s labor supply, the first summand on the right-hand side of equation (17) is the smaller, the larger
the stock of immigrants, ceteris paribus. Hence, any immigration shock depresses the differential migration gain, ∆sU ij , and thus
induces the ratio of new high-skilled to new low-skilled migrants to decline. This relationship can also be seen by differentiating




17The website is http://www.ine.es.
18Officially, Spain is divided into 52 provinces which are nested in 19 regions. We exclude the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla due
to their specific geographical location. This yields a total of 50 provinces and 17 regions for the estimations of the first and the
second model, respectively. See http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/codmun/cod provincia.htm and http://www.ine.es/
daco/daco42/codmun/cod ccaa.htm (both accessed on 04/17/2012) for a list of provinces and regions, respectively.
19The 55 most important migrant-sending countries are those with an ethnic community in Spain of at least 630 migrants in the year
1996.
20An alternative approach would be to estimate the fixed effects by including a dummy variable for each origin country i. Such a
specification would not be without problems. To see this, note the following: Although we employ cross-sectional data, their structure
is similar to that of panel data. Since we distinguish origin countries (dimension i) and destination provinces in Spain (dimension
j), we have a cluster sample in the sense that each observation (dimension ij) belongs to a single country i (the primary cluster).
One can think of the total number of destinations in Spain as being fixed. However, if this number is fixed and the total number of
origin countries goes to infinity, I → ∞, the country-specific parameters, µi, would be inconsistently estimated. The reason is that
the number of fixed effects to be estimated increases with sample size; see the incidental parameters problem described in Neyman &
Scott (1984). The problem would be particularly relevant at later stages of our analysis when consistently estimated fixed effects are
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in the term µi, but also those nested in the term µiz , given that our migration data refer to a single country z
(Spain). Notice that this simple fixed effects model thus controls for the multilateral resistance effects in
the terms µi and µiz and allows for violations of the IIA property for final migration destinations located in
different countries.
The dependent variable is the log of the bilateral migration flow into Spanish provinces, obtained from the
Spanish Residential Variation Statistics and aggregated from the beginning of 1997 until the end of 2006.21
This period covers Spain’s unprecedented immigration boom, which was eventually attenuated by the global
financial and economic crisis starting in the year 2007. As to the explanatory variables, we use data for earlier
years where possible, in order to exclude the possibility of reverse causality. The size of the ethnic community,
Mij , is measured by the number of settled bilateral migrants in the year 1996, as reported by the Spanish
Municipal Register. We rely on population figures disaggregated by nationalities and Spanish provinces as
of 1 May 1996. The reason why these migration data include documented and undocumented migrants is
that all immigrants are strongly incentivized to register in the local Municipal Register, irrespective of their
legal status. This incentive derives from the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain and their
Social Integration in 2000 (Ley Orgánica 4/2000, artı́culo 12), which entitles all registered foreigners (with
or without legal residence permits) to free medical care under the same conditions as Spanish nationals. Each
registrant must provide his or her name, surname, sex, usual domicile, nationality, passport number, as well
as the place and date of birth.22 Importantly, this information must be treated confidentially by the Municipal
Register. In particular, it must not be communicated to other administrative units, such that the probability of
forced repatriation is independent of registration.
Data on both trade and FDI are provided by the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. We
measure bilateral trade flows, tij , by the sum of exports and imports (in Euros) between country i and Spanish
province j in the year 1996. These information are taken from DataComex Statistics on Spanish Foreign
Trade. Ideally, we would like to use bilateral FDI stocks to measure inward investment, Fij , but we only
have information on bilateral gross FDI inflows (in Euros) observed at the level of Spanish regions. These are
detailed by the country of the last owner and are available from DataInvex Statistics on Foreign Investments in
essential (as in the first stage of two stage least squares analysis) or non-linear models are employed (as in the first stage of Heckman’s
two step selection model). An important circumstance in which our fixed effects estimator delivers inconsistent estimates is when zero
values inflate the dependent variable; see Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) for arguments in favor of the Poisson estimator in the gravity
context of international trade. In our sample we observe only a modest number of zero migration flows (5.75% of all country-province
pairs) and therefore apply the fixed effects estimator.
21We aggregate all migrants who registered at Spanish municipalities between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2006 by their
country of origin. Migrants are defined as individuals for whom the last country of residence (other than Spain) corresponds to their
country of birth and nationality. In their raw form, the migration flow data are observed for periods of less than a year. Aggregating
the data over time precludes the possibility of applying panel estimation techniques. We do so on purpose, however, because the
model cannot deal with a time dimension in any convenient way, unless we make the very strong assumption that each individual
left in the home country draws new realizations of the random term for all destinations (including the home country) in every period.
Alternatively, one would have to assume that the pool of potential migrants from a given source country does not change over time.
22For further information, see INE at http://www.ine.es/en/metodologia/t20/t203024566 en.htm, accessed on
08/19/2011.
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Spain. Due to limited data availability, we have to use FDI flows for the year 1997. We argue, however, that
endogeneity is unlikely, given that firms base their investment decisions on long-term considerations instead
of short- or medium-term forecasts. All effects specific to destination provinces, nested in µj , are to a large
extent unobservable. We therefore include a comprehensive set of dummy variables to mitigate endogeneity
concerns due to omitted variables bias.
More demanding specifications of our fixed effects model control for country-and-region fixed effects.
These are eliminated by computing all variables as deviations from their country-and-region means instead of
country means. This approach greatly reduces the probability of omitted variables bias, because it eliminates
the term µir in the model of equation (14). As we have argued above, this term captures both the multilateral
resistance effects with dimension ir and the full geographical and cultural distance between source and desti-
nation.23 The complete specification of our fixed effects model furthermore controls for the term µwj through
a comprehensive set of dummy variables.
In a first set of regressions, we estimate average values for the elasticity of the migration inflow variable
with respect to the migrant stock variable for Spain (network elasticity).24 This approach allows us to compare
our estimates to those reported in the existing literature. The second part of proposition 1, however, tells us
that the estimated network elasticity should be large for regions with similar provinces (small κr) and small
for regions with dissimilar provinces (large κr). Hence, we also estimate region-specific network elasticities,
interacting the migrant stock variable with dummy variables for the different Spanish regions. This estimation
can be seen as a test of whether or not the IIA assumption is violated for final migration destinations located
in different Spanish regions, as is possible in our model. In case we do find cross-regional differences in the
estimated network elasticity, this is strong evidence for a violation of the IIA property.
Finally, if variables specific to country-province combinations and correlated with both mij and Mij are
omitted from the model, the size of the ethnic community is endogenous to the subsequent migrant flow. In this
case, the fixed effects model produces biased and inconsistent estimates. Consistent estimation is still possible,
however, provided an instrument which is uncorrelated with the structural error term but correlated with the
endogenous regressor is available. We adopt an instrumental variables approach in which we instrument the
size of the bilateral ethnic community in the year 1996, Mij , with the log of the number of people of country i
who register at destination j in the year 1988. The underlying hypothesis is that historical bilateral migration
flows correlate with the migrant stocks in Spain even after a relatively long period of time, but not with the
unobserved determinants of the recent immigration boom.25 We use the square of the historical bilateral
23Note that this more encompassing model does not allow us to identify the coefficient of the bilateral investment term because data
on investment are only available at the regional level.
24Notice that the full network elasticity includes the effects operating through the multilateral resistance term. In what follows, we
assume that these effects are negligibly small when we are referring to the network elasticity.
25The year 1988 is the first year for which such detailed information are available. It is well before the start of the Spanish immi-
gration boom. Our instrument includes all people with a foreign nationality registering at Spanish municipalities in 1988, irrespective
of their country of birth and their last place of residence. Hence, in contrast to the definition of our migrant flow variable, it includes
internal migration in Spain. We add one to the number of people before taking the log in order to keep observations with zero migrant
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migration flows as a second excluded instrument. This allows us to perform tests on overidentifying restrictions
and check for instrument exogeneity.
3.2 Skill Structure of Immigration Flows
Aggregate migration data with reliable information on the skill structure of immigration can only be con-
structed at the level of Spanish regions instead of provinces. Hence, the second model for the skill structure of
immigration flows, given by equation (15), cannot be estimated at the level of provinces. In principle, there are
two alternative ways to estimate the model at the more aggregate level of Spanish regions. The first is to rule
out regions as secondary clusters from the very beginning, and to consider the set of Spanish regions to form the
set of final migration destinations within the primary cluster of Spain. In terms of our model, this is equivalent
to setting κr equal to unity for all r and letting each Spanish region be a final migration destination j,j ∈ Aiz ,
where country z is Spain.26 The second way is to derive the migration function for migration into Spanish
regions from the existing three-level nesting structure of the NMNL migration model. The starting point is to
use equations (8) and (9) to compute the probability P oi (j








It is easy to show, then, that the two alternative approaches lead to two different migration functions, because
they are derived from two different models which are not fully compatible with each other. In what follows, we
lay out our estimation strategy for the first approach and report the corresponding results in the next section.
We have checked for robustness of our results using the second approach, but abstain from providing detailed
estimation results.27
In principle, the parameters in equation (15) are consistently estimated in a fixed effects model which






, measures the skill content of migration. It is defined as the log ratio of the number of new high-
skilled immigrants over the number of new low-skilled immigration from country i in region j, aggregated over
the five-year period from 2002 to 2006. These information are obtained by aggregating micro-level data from
the National Immigrant Survey 2007 (NIS). The NIS defines immigrants as individuals aged 16 years or older
who were born abroad and have lived in Spain for more than a year, or at least intended to stay for more than
a year at the time the survey was conducted.28 Importantly, this definition is independent of the individual’s
legal status, such that the data again include documented and undocumented migrants. The survey gathers
unique information on a total of 15,465 migrants through field interviews conducted between November 2006
and February 2007. The sample was obtained through a relatively complex three-stage sampling scheme,
flows.
26Notice that this approach acknowledges the similarity among all Spanish regions (measured by 1−λz) but rules out any similarities
of Spanish regions at the sub-country level. This assumption will be tested in the next section.
27Subsection 4.2 includes a short description of these robustness checks.
28Foreign-born individuals with Spanish nationality from birth who migrated to Spain within two years after birth are not considered
as immigrants.
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which was designed to offer reliable and representative data to policy makers and researchers. More detailed
information on the sampling can be found in Reher & Requena (2009) and INE (2007). In the survey, migrants
report, inter alia, their year of arrival in Spain, their first destination in Spain, as well as their highest level
of education they completed before migrating. We obtain skill-specific migrant flows by aggregating the
number of individuals by country of birth and Spanish destination region, distinguishing between migrants
with completed tertiary education before migrating (high-skilled) and those without (low-skilled) and applying
the provided population weights. Although the data can be considered representative of immigrants who
arrived shortly before the survey was taken, the numbers for earlier cohorts are less reliable due to the lack of
information on immigrants who died, returned or migrated onward. We deal with the trade-off between a large
number of individuals and data representativeness in that we consider only immigrants who arrived in Spain
between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2006.
The size of the ethnic community, Mij , is measured by the migrant stock observed at the level of Spanish
regions as of 1 January 2002. These data are again taken from the Spanish Municipal Register. The sum of
bilateral import and export values, tij , is collected at the level of Spanish regions for the year 2001. Bilateral
investment stocks as of 2001 are approximated by gross FDI inflows from the beginning of 1998 until the
end of 2001. In this model for the skill structure of immigration flows, differences in the size of the ethnic
community across country-region combinations are used as identifying variation. Consequently, the fixed
effects model cannot control for country-and-region effects. We instead augment the model by observable
bilateral factors which are considered part of the term ψir in µ
∗
ir. In particular, we control for the geographical
distance between origin country i and Spanish region r29, as well as for common language between source and
destination through the inclusion of an indicator variable. This indicator variable takes on the value one if at
least 80% of the Spanish region’s total population are native speakers of a language spoken by at least 20% of
the people living in the origin country, and zero otherwise. The information on native languages in Spanish
regions are taken from a number of recent survey studies carried out in Spain.30 Language information on the
origin countries come from Mayer & Zignago (2006). As with the previous model on the scale of immigration
flows, the influence of all terms indexed j, nested in µ∗j , is absorbed by a full set of dummy variables for the
different Spanish regions. The complete specification of our model furthermore controls for world region-and-
region fixed effects, µ∗wj .
For some combinations of origin countries and destination regions we lack information on the skill ratio,





is unobserved. This raises concerns of endogenous sample selection. It can be
shown that the probability of observing the skill ratio is an increasing function of the total number of bilateral
immigrants over the period considered. We follow Beine et al. (2011) in implementing a two-step Heckman
29Distances are constructed using the STATA module GEODIST by Picard (2010). Latitudinal and longitudinal data of origin coun-
tries are taken from Mayer & Zignago (2006). Coordinates for the Spanish regions are obtained from the Spanish Wikipedia/GeoHack
webpage.
30See table A.1 in the appendix for a list of surveys.
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procedure which goes back to the seminal work by Heckman (1976). The first step of this procedure estimates





on the full sample including observations for which
data on the skill ratio are missing (selection equation). The selection equation includes all explanatory variables
of equation (15) as right-hand side variables, plus the number of new bilateral immigrants from country i
in region j over the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2006. We thus apply a single exclusion
restriction to equation (15) (the structural equation). The second step uses all observations for which the
dependent variable is actually observed to estimate the structural equation, augmented by the inverse Mills
ratio obtained from the first step as an explanatory variable. As a further robustness check, we apply the
instrumental variables approach to this model for the skill structure of immigration flows, by analogy to the
model for the scale of immigration flows.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents and discusses our estimation results. We start out with a descriptive look at the rela-
tionship between the scale and skill structure of immigration flows and the size of ethnic communities in final
migration destinations in Spain. Figure 2(a) is a scatter plot for immigration between 1997 and 2006 ver-
sus ethnic communities in 1996, where each dot stands for a combination of origin country and destination
province in Spain. We observe a positive correlation between the two variables. Figure 2(b) is a scatter plot for
the skill content of immigration between 2002 and 2006 versus ethnic communities at the beginning of 2002,
where now each dot represents a combination of origin country and destination region in Spain. The figure
suggests a weak negative correlation between the two variables. Hence, both figures give tentative support
for the first part of propositions 1 and 2. In what follows, we test whether these correlations reflect a causal
relationship running from ethnic communities to the scale and skill structure of immigration.
Figure 2: Ethnic Communities and the Scale and Skill Structure of Subsequent Immigration Flows  	
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4.1 Results for the Scale of Immigration Flows
This subsection presents the estimation results of the first model for the scale of immigration flows as specified
in equation (14). We first abstract from a key feature of this model, viz. that the network elasticity may vary
across Spanish regions due to cross-regional differences in the degree of substitutability between any two final
migration destinations located in the same region.31 Hence, we first estimate an average network elasticity in
Spain which can be compared to the results reported by Beine et al. (2012), who use comparable data for the
US and estimate a model similar to ours.32 Tables 1 and 2 show the results from the fixed effects model and
the two stage least squares (2SLS) fixed effects model, respectively. In columns (a) and (b) of both tables, we
eliminate country fixed effects via an adequate within-transformation. The number of observations is equal
to 2,592, which is the result of having 55 origin countries, 50 provinces, and 158 undefined values for the
dependent variable due to zero migrant flows (55 × 50 − 158 = 2, 592). In columns (c) to (f), we modify
the within-transformation so as to eliminate country-and-region fixed effects. The number of observations is
reduced to 2,209, given that this approach must exclude seven regional destinations in Spain, each consisting
of a single province.33
In the most parsimonious specification of the fixed effects model in column (a) of table 1, the estimated
coefficient of the migrant stock variable is equal to 0.686. This value is impressively close to the value reported
by Beine et al. (2012). The coefficient is estimated with very high precision (robust standard error equal to
0.021) and thus statistically significant at the 1% level. Augmenting the model by bilateral FDI and trade
flows in column (b), we see that the coefficient of the FDI variable is positive and highly significant. Yet,
the point estimate of this coefficient is equal to 0.012 and thus implies a moderate quantitative importance
only. Bilateral trading relations, instead, do not seem to have a significant impact on the scale of migration.
Maybe more importantly, the estimates of the network elasticity are virtually unchanged in this version of the
model. What does change the estimates is controlling for country-and-region fixed effects in columns (c) and
(d). We see a drop in the coefficient of the migrant stock variable down to 0.533, which corresponds to a
decrease by roughly 20%. We see a further reduction by more than 10% once we take out the variation that is
constant for each combination of world regions and Spanish provinces via dummy variables. Our results point
towards a sizeable upward bias in the estimation of the family and friends effect in specifications (a)-(c) due to
unobserved heterogeneity.
31Of course, this applies to the elasticities of the migration inflow with respect to FDI and trade flows as well.
32Beine et al. (2012) distinguish between local and national network externalities. Our estimates of the family and friends effect
can be compared to their local assimilation effect, which is given by their estimate of the parameter α in table 1 on page 16 of Beine
et al. (2012) (α̂ ≈ 0.7).
33Applying the within-transformation to such observations yields all zeros.
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Table 1: Scale of Immigration Flows – Fixed Effects Model†
Dependent Variable: Migration Inflow (Province-Level 1997-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants 0.686*** 0.680*** 0.533*** 0.534*** 0.467*** 0.467***
(Province-Level 1996) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
FDI Flow 0.012***
(Region-Level 1997) (0.004)
Trade Flow 0.006 0.004 0.009
(Province-Level 1996) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -0.040 -0.064 -0.082 -0.079 -0.125 -0.120
(0.102) (0.102) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079)
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested Nested
Country-and-Region Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Province E. No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209
Within R2 0.786 0.786 0.660 0.660 0.755 0.755
† All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with at least 630 nationals
residing in Spain in the year 1996 (55 origin countries). See section 3 for a detailed description of all variables.
The 2SLS fixed effects estimations in table 2 substantially strengthen our interpretation of a quantitatively
important and causal effect of ethnic communities on the scale of immigration. They report a somewhat larger
role for the family and friends effect, with an elasticity ranging between 0.776 and 0.986. As before, the
coefficient of the migrant stock variable is lowest when we control for country-and-region effects as well as
for world region-and-province effects. This result gives further credit to our earlier interpretation regarding the
effects of omitted variables. The loss in precision from using the 2SLS fixed effects approach is fairly small if
interpreted relative to the fixed effects model. The effects of both trade and FDI on the scale of immigration
flows are essentially zero.
The IV diagnostics are all encouraging. The first-stage F statistic for the joint significance of the excluded
instruments is relatively high and thus points to the relevance and strength of the instruments. It exceeds
the critical value of 10 in all specifications, which is required for reliable inference in the case of a single
endogenous regressor; see Stock et al. (2002). Wooldridge’s robust score χ2 test of overidentifying restrictions
checks for instrument exogeneity. The null hypothesis (exogeneity) of this test can never be rejected at any
reasonable significance level. This suggests that our instruments are uncorrelated with the structural error term,
and that our structural equation is correctly specified. We also report the results from two exogeneity tests for
the migrant stock variable. Wooldridge’s robust score χ2 test and the robust regression-based F test both reject
the null hypothesis that the stock variable is exogenous at the 1% level. The migrant stock variable should thus
indeed be treated as endogenous.
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Table 2: Scale of Immigration Flows – 2SLS Fixed Effects Model†
Dependent Variable: Migration Inflow (Province-Level 1997-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants 0.986*** 0.985*** 0.831*** 0.834*** 0.776*** 0.778***
(Province-Level 1996) (0.037) (0.037) (0.055) (0.055) (0.071) (0.071)
FDI Flow 0.003
(Region-Level 1997) (0.004)
Trade Flow 0.004 0.006 0.009
(Province-Level 1996) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 0.110 0.098 0.110 0.115 0.075 0.081
(0.113) (0.113) (0.084) (0.084) (0.087) (0.088)
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested Nested
Country-and-Region Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Province E. No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209
Within R2 0.759 0.759 0.621 0.621 0.726 0.726
Robust first-stage F test 211.2 205.9 71.85 72.04 38.61 38.61
Test on Overidentifying R.
Robust score χ2 test 0.044 0.060 0.165 0.153 2.201 2.109
- p-value 0.834 0.807 0.685 0.695 0.138 0.146
Exogeneity Test
Robust score χ2 test 73.26 73.80 29.30 29.79 18.40 18.63
- p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust regression F test 81.96 82.75 30.45 31.01 16.73 16.95
- p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
† All variables are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries with at least 630 nationals
residing in Spain in the year 1996 (55 origin countries). The (log) stock of migrants in 1996 is instrumented with the
(log) flow of foreign nationals in the year 1988 as well as with the square of this variable. See section 3 for a detailed
description of all variables.
Our next specification allows for cross-regional differences in the parameter κr. These should be reflected
in differences in the quantitative importance of the family and friends effect across Spanish regions. The
specification employed is equivalent to the one reported in column (f) of table 1, except for the fact that we
now interact the migrant stock variable with dummy variables for the different Spanish regions. Table 3 reveals
substantial heterogeneity in the size of the network elasticity across Spanish regions. The elasticity value is
largest for Cataluña (0.781) and smallest for Extremadura (0.144).34 According to our theoretical model, the
heterogeneity in the estimated network elasticity must be due to cross-regional differences in the degree of
dissimilarity of final migration destinations located in the same Spanish region, captured by the parameter κr.
Hence, individuals seem to consider the provinces in Cataluña (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona)
34In the estimation, Cataluña serves as the reference region. The differences between the elasticities estimated for Cataluña and for
either of the other regions (except for Comunitat Valenciana) are statistically significant at least at the 10% level according to t-tests.
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to be very similar, relative to the provinces in Extremadura (Badajoz and Cáceres). This result accords with
the pronounced autonomy of Cataluña in terms of its political and cultural life. At any rate, the large and
significant cross-regional differences in the estimated network elasticity implies a strong violation of the IIA
assumption for final migration destinations located in different Spanish regions.
Table 3: Network Elasticity, by Spanish Region†
Spanish Region r Estimate of θγ/(λzκr) Spanish Region r Estimate of θγ/(λzκr)
Cataluña 0.781 Aragón 0.500
Comunitat Valenciana 0.699 Castilla y León 0.452
Galicia 0.562 Paı́s Vasco 0.316
Canarias 0.524 Castilla-La Mancha 0.179
Andalucı́a 0.500 Extremadura 0.144
† This table reports region-specific estimates of the elasticity of the migration inflow variable with respect to the migrant
stock variable. The specification employed is equivalent to that reported in column (f) of table 1, except that we interact
the migrant stock variable with dummy variables for the different Spanish regions. According to F tests for the joint
significance of the coefficients of the migrant stock variable and of either of the interaction terms (not reported), the
above-reported elasticities are all significant at the 1% level. The number of observations is 2,209, and the within R2 is
0.763.
4.2 Results for the Skill Structure of Immigration Flows
Tables 4 and 5 report, respectively, the results from fixed effects and Heckman estimations of our second
model for the skill structure of immigration flows as specified in equation (15). Recall that we define Spanish
regions as final migration destinations and employ regional data instead of provincial data in the following
estimations. The fixed effects estimator is applied to 241 observations with non-missing values for the migrant
skill ratio (the dependent variable). The full matrix contains 935 combinations of 55 origin countries and 17
destination regions. Throughout all specifications employed in table 4, we find a robustly significant negative
impact of ethnic migrant communities on the skill ratio of immigration flows, as suggested by theory. The
estimated elasticity varies between -0.399 and -0.354, but the differences are never statistically significant at
any reasonable level of confidence. Neither the trade nor the FDI variable turn out to be statistically significant.
This finding is not surprising in light of the poorly suggestive evidence in favor of a positive effect of trade or
FDI on the scale of immigration flows. Maybe surprisingly, the effects of a common language and geographical
proximity are also estimated to be zero, but one should keep in mind here that identification comes only from
within-cluster variation.
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Table 4: Skill Structure of Immigration Flows – Fixed Effects Model†
Dependent Variable: Migrant Skill Ratio (Region-Level 2002-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants -0.399*** -0.395*** -0.390*** -0.380*** -0.374*** -0.354***
(Region-Level 2002) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.096) (0.097) (0.100)
FDI Flow -0.007 -0.017
(Region-Level 1997-2001) (0.017) (0.019)
Trade Flow -0.013 0.040
(Region-Level 2001) (0.078) (0.103)
Language 0.302 0.297 0.178 0.268
(Region-Level) (0.198) (0.198) (0.403) (0.403)
Distance -0.411 -0.449 -0.155 -0.175
(Region-Level) (0.350) (0.365) (0.483) (0.506)
Constant 0.545** 0.529** 0.560** 0.514* 0.494* 0.463
(0.233) (0.236) (0.253) (0.267) (0.273) (0.301)
Region Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241
Within R2 0.201 0.213 0.214 0.383 0.384 0.387
† All variables except for the language dummy are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. See section 3 for a detailed description
of all variables.
We have argued above that the fixed effects estimator may deliver biased estimates due to endogenous
sample selection. Table 5 therefore reports the results from the two-step Heckman model with fixed effects.
These results confirm our concerns about endogenous sample selection regarding the dependent variable. In
all specifications considered, the coefficient estimate of the inverse Mills ratio is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level, which suggests that the fixed effects estimations indeed suffer from sampling bias.35
Recall that the selection equation (first step; not reported) employs the log of the number of new bilateral
immigrants from country i in region j over the period from 2002 to 2006 as a single exclusion restriction. As
expected, its estimated coefficient is also highly significant and positive.
35The inverse Mills ratio is defined as the ratio of the standard normal probability density function to the standard normal cumulative
distribution function, both evaluated at the linear prediction from the first stage estimates.
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Table 5: Skill Structure of Immigration Flows – Two-Step Heckman Model with Fixed Effects†
Dependent Variable: Migrant Skill Ratio (Region-Level 2002-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants -0.379*** -0.375*** -0.370*** -0.351*** -0.336*** -0.317***
(Region-Level 2002) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.073) (0.074) (0.076)
FDI Flow -0.006 -0.019
(Region-Level 1997-2001) (0.015) (0.015)
Trade Flow -0.008 0.057
(Region-Level 2001) (0.072) (0.076)
Language 0.282 0.278 0.344 0.445
(Region-Level) (0.217) (0.217) (0.430) (0.436)
Distance -0.398 -0.430 -0.163 -0.165
(Region-Level) (0.360) (0.372) (0.480) (0.486)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.229** 0.233** 0.232** 0.257** 0.282** 0.282**
(0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111)
Constant 0.331 0.312 0.338 0.269 0.208 0.158
(0.224) (0.223) (0.241) (0.220) (0.232) (0.257)
Region Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241
† All variables except for the language dummy are in natural logs. Heckman-corrected standard errors are given in
parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The regressions include all countries
with at least 630 nationals residing in Spain in the year 1996 (55 origin countries). The selection equation of the two-step
Heckman procedure is augmented by the total number of new bilateral immigrants over the period from 2002 to 2006.
The structural equation is supplemented by the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first step and uses all observations
for which the dependent variables is actually observed. See section 3 for a detailed description of all variables.
This evidence in favor of endogenous sample selection notwithstanding, our conclusions in terms of the
family and friends effect on the skill structure of immigration flows remain virtually unchanged both qualita-
tively and quantitatively. The point estimates of the elasticity of the migrant skill ratio with respect to the size
of the migrant community at destination are found to be only slightly smaller in absolute terms in the Heckman
estimations compared to the fixed effects estimations, ranging between -0.379 and -0.317. As with the fixed
effects model, the migrant stock variable is the only structural explanatory variable whose effect is statistically
different from zero.
We have checked the robustness of our results and the validity of some underlying assumptions in various
ways. First, we have applied the least squares correction for selectivity bias proposed by Olsen (1980) to the
data. The Olsen-correction employs a linear probability model (LPM) in the first step instead of a non-linear
Probit model, as does the Heckman model. The results obtained from this alternative selection correction
(not reported) are fully in line with those from our Heckman estimations. Second, we have pursued a 2SLS
fixed effects approach by complete analogy to the model for the scale of immigration flows. The results are
reported in table A.3 in the appendix. They do not alter our causal interpretation in any significant way. Third,
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following the methodology proposed by Grogger & Hanson (2011, 53-54), we have excluded the possibility
that individuals group Spanish regions into clusters at the sub-country level.36 To do so, we have repeatedly
estimated the scale model as given in equation (14), using regional data instead of provincial data and each
time excluding the observations for one Spanish region.37 The estimated network elasticity is very stable across
regressions, ranging between 0.681 and 0.742.
Finally, we have estimated a migration function which describes migration into Spanish regions but which
derives from the three-level NMNL model featuring Spanish provinces instead of regions as final migration
destinations; see also the discussion at the beginning of subsection 3.2. A complication in this framework is
that this migration function depends, among other things, on the number of provinces in each regional cluster
and the within-cluster distribution of ethnic communities across provinces. This last argument is part of a
highly non-linear term, which collapses to zero, however, if we look at regions consisting of a single province.
Hence, we have estimated the model excluding all regions consisting of more than one province.38 In spite of
the reduced number of observations, our estimates (not reported) continue to reflect a negative and statistically
significant impact of ethnic communities on the skill structure of immigration.39
5 Conclusion
Considering data from the recent Spanish immigration experience, we have shown that existing ethnic migrant
communities in Spanish provinces or regions spur further migration to these destinations, and cause the skill
content of this subsequent migration to decline. Both effects are economically significant and robust across
different specifications. We have used the variation in the data across combinations of a large number of origin
countries and Spanish provinces or regions, in order to identify the causal effects of ethnic communities on
the scale and skill structure of immigration. Unlike previous studies on network effects in migration, we have
allowed for final migration destinations within the same country or region to be similar from the perspective of
prospective migrants. This implies a partial relaxation of the IIA assumption. Our approach is corroborated by
the significant degree of cross-regional heterogeneity in our estimates of the network elasticity, which points
towards rich substitution patterns among final migration destinations. Furthermore, from our estimates of the
average network elasticity in Spain we deduce that previous estimates are upward-biased due to unobserved
heterogeneity.
36Notice that this additional clustering would lead to a misspecified migration function due to a violation of the IIA assumption for
the different destination regions in Spain.
37In these estimations, we eliminate country fixed effects via an adequate within-transformation, and we control for fixed effects for
each combination of world regions and Spanish destination regions in addition to bilateral trade flows.
38This is a valid approach as long as individuals do not group Spanish regions into clusters at the sub-country level, which we have
shown to be true above.
39We have also experimented with two alternative estimation approaches following Quigley (1976) and Lerman (1976). Both include
the full set of regions in Spain and are summarized in McFadden (1978, 547-550). Again, we have obtained a robustly significant,
negative impact of ethnic communities on the skill structure of immigration.
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Our findings add to the understanding of the recent immigration phenomenon in Spain. Arguably, this
immigration has gained momentum through Spain’s strong economic growth in the years prior to the Global
Financial Crisis. However, our analysis has revealed that it has also been reinforced by existing ethnic ties
between source and destination. This immigration has in turn led to a change in the size and composition of the
country’s population and labor supply, with potentially important effects on a number of key macroeconomic
variables such as wages, unemployment, and production, as well as on the national welfare state. On top of
the substantial challenges deriving from immigration, the Spanish economy has been affected severely by the
global economic downturn in 2007/08, with national output plummeting and unemployment, especially youth
unemployment, hitting record levels. Recent numbers suggest that this is reflected in a sharp decline in new
immigration and a significant amount of return migration in the very short run. The conjoint analysis of the
structural relationships among past migration, future migration, wages, and employment involves non-trivial
dynamics. Attempts to study these dynamics in a unified framework seem to appear as a challenging yet
promising avenue for future research.
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[8] Beine, Michel, Frédéric Docquier, and Çağlar Özden, “Dissecting Network Externalities in International
Migration,” University of Luxembourg mimeograph (2012).
[9] Beine, Michel, and Sara Salomone, “Migration and Networks: Does Education Matter more than Gen-
der?,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics (forthcoming).
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Appendix
Table A.1: Data Sources†
Data Source
Migrant Flows http://www.ine.es/en/prodyser/micro varires en.htm, accessed on
10/05/2010
Migrant Skill Ratios http://www.ine.es/prodyser/micro inmigra.htm, accessed on 10/05/2010
Migrant Communities http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft20%
2Fe245 &file=inebase&L=0, accessed on 10/07/2010
Trade Flows http://datacomex.comercio.es/principal comex es.aspx, accessed on
10/20/2010
FDI Flows http://datainvex.comercio.es/principal invex.aspx, accessed on
10/20/2010
Historical Flows of Foreign Nationals http://www.ine.es/en/prodyser/micro varires en.htm, accessed on
10/05/2010
Geographical Coordinates http://es.wikipedia.org, accessed on 09/05/2011; Mayer & Zignago (2006)
Native Languages in Spanish Regions Cataluña: Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d’Estadı́stica de Catalunya (2008). En-
questa d’usos lingüı́stics de la població 2008.
Comunidad Foral de Navarra: Instituto de Estadı́stica de Navarra (2001). Censo 2001
de Población y Viviendas en Navarra.
Comunitat Valenciana: Universidad de Salamanca (2007). Estudio CIS No. 2.667. La
identitad nacional en España.
Galicia: Instituto Galego de Estatı́stica (2008). Enquisa de condicións de vida das
familias. Coñecemento e uso do galego. Edición 2008
Illes Balears: Villaverde i Vidal, J. A. (2003). L’Enquesta Sociolingüı́stica 2003.
Principals Resultats.
Paı́s Vasco: Universidad de Salamanca (2007). Estudio CIS No. 2.667. La identitad
nacional en España.
† See section 3 for the variable definitions and descriptions of how the considered micro-data have been aggre-
gated.
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Table A.2: List of the 55 Countries Considered in the Empirical Analysis, by World Regions
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC Cuba NORTH AMERICA WESTERN EUROPE
China Dominican Republic & AUSTRALIA Austria
Japan Ecuador Australia Belgium
Korea El Salvador Canada Denmark
Philippines Honduras United States Finland
Mexico France
EASTERN EUROPE Peru SOUTH ASIA Germany
& CENTRAL ASIA Uruguay India Ireland
Bosnia and Herzegowina Venezuela Pakistan Italy
Bulgaria Netherlands
Poland MIDDLE EAST SUB-SAHARAN Norway
Romania & NORTH AFRICA AFRICA Portugal
Russia Algeria Angola Sweden
Egypt Cape Verde Switzerland
LATIN AMERICA Iran Equatorial Guinea United Kingdom







Table A.3: Skill Structure of Immigration Flows – 2SLS Fixed Effects Model†
Dependent Variable: Migrant Skill Ratio (Region-Level 2002-2006)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Stock of Migrants -0.458*** -0.459*** -0.448*** -0.517*** -0.516*** -0.501***
(Region-Level 2002) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.140) (0.142) (0.144)
FDI Flow -0.004 -0.011
(Region-Level 1997-2001) (0.017) (0.017)
Trade Flow -0.007 0.036
(Region-Level 2001) (0.076) (0.087)
Language 0.304 0.301 0.049 0.114
(Region-Level) (0.189) (0.189) (0.357) (0.362)
Distance -0.392 -0.417 -0.107 -0.109
(Region-Level) (0.333) (0.351) (0.428) (0.443)
Constant 0.643** 0.632** 0.638** 0.740** 0.738** 0.699**
(0.272) (0.273) (0.270) (0.305) (0.316) (0.320)
Region Effects Yes Yes Yes Nested Nested Nested
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
World Region-and-Region E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241
Within R2 0.198 0.210 0.211 0.373 0.374 0.377
Robust first-stage F test 46.41 44.64 46.81 42.41 40.03 40.69
Test on Overidentifying R.
Robust score χ2 test 3.672 3.229 3.050 1.219 1.268 1.153
- p-value 0.055 0.072 0.081 0.270 0.260 0.283
Exogeneity Test
Robust score χ2 test 0.553 0.637 0.531 1.972 2.017 2.081
- p-value 0.457 0.425 0.466 0.160 0.156 0.149
Robust regression F test 0.512 0.587 0.486 1.410 1.428 1.456
- p-value 0.475 0.444 0.486 0.237 0.234 0.229
† All variables except for the language dummy are in natural logs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The (log) stock of migrants in 2002
is instrumented with the (log) flow of foreign nationals in the year 1988 as well as with the square of this variable. See
section 3 for a detailed description of all variables.
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